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The ‘historical alternatives’ approach advocates research into the role of national 
institutions and public policies in the resilience, or decline, of industrial districts. 
Policies in support of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were launched in 
various western economies in the second half of the twentieth century. This article 
focuses on the paradigmatic Italian case, and investigates the impact of government 
financial subsidies for SMEs on firms located in a southern and a northeastern district, 
between 1971 and 1991. This discussion deepens our understanding of the role of 
national policies in the re-emergence of industrial districts in the decades of the 
‘Second Industrial Divide’. Furthermore, it indicates the importance of firms’ 
utilization of subsidies and their ecosystem as complementary to the policy’s 
effectiveness. 
 
Keywords: small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); industrial districts; the 
‘Second Industrial Divide’; government policies; regional policy. 
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Building Industrial Districts: Do Subsidies Help? 
Evidence from Post-War Italy 
 
 
The “historical alternatives” approach argues that at any point in history 
various patterns of business organizations and different combinations of production 
factors are viable. These might be complementary or competing for inputs and 
markets.1 This article focuses on a pattern of business organization, industrial districts 
(henceforth districts), that was dominant until the advent of mass production in the 
nineteenth century and re-emerged during the volatile economic conditions of the 
1970s and 1980s.2 
In explaining the revival of districts in the 1970s and 1980s, identified as the 
“Second Industrial Divide”, the role of national industrial policies seemed negligible, 
mainly because they were rare, and even detrimental. Even when central governments 
introduced successful policies for small businesses, these were portrayed as either 
short-lived, or failing to keep pace with rapidly changing economic scenarios.3 
However, governments in various western economies introduced policies in favor of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the second half of the twentieth 
century. The diffusion of such policies calls for research into their impact on districts, 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Zeitlin, “The Historical Alternatives Approach,” in Oxford Handbook of Business History, 
ed. Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford, 2008), 120-140; Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan 
Zeitlin, “Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in Nineteenth-
Century Industrialization,” Past and Present 108 (August, 1985): 133-176. 
2Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New 
York, 1984); Arnaldo Bagnasco, Tre Italie. La Problematica Territoriale dello Sviluppo Italiano 
(Bologna, 1977); Sebastiano Brusco, “The Emilian Model: Productive Decentralisation and Social 
Integration,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 6 (June 1982): 167-184. 
3 Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial Divide, 304; Peer H. Kristensen and Charles Sabel, “The Small-
holder Economy in Denmark: the Exception as Variation,” in World of Possibilities, ed. Charles F. 
Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (Cambridge, 1997), 374-378. 
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and Italy is an ideal case-study given their importance to its economy and the scant 
research on the role of national institutions in the growth of districts.4 
This article focuses on a specific tool of government intervention - financial 
subsidies in the form of soft loans and grants for SMEs, and discusses their 
importance for two districts: Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli (San Mauro). Both 
specialized in footwear, one of the “Made in Italy” sectors typical of Italian districts 
which are also important sources of export revenues.5 Barletta is located in southern 
Italy, whereas San Mauro is in the classical area of industrial districts, the Northeast 
and Centre, also called “Third Italy” because its pattern of industrialization, i.e. small 
businesses organized in districts, distinguished it from the northwestern industrial 
triangle and the under-industrialized South.6 Their geographical locations enable 
comparison of subsidies within the framework of regional policy, the “Extraordinary 
Intervention for the South,” with national industrial policy. Furthermore, this research 
investigates the much less studied perspective of firms receiving such subsidies, rather 
than solely the institutional viewpoint.7  
The 1970s and 1980s were of critical importance for both policies and districts 
in Italy. Various factors exacerbated the well-known small businesses’ financial 
constraints: instabilities in the credit market, increased prices of inputs and restrictive 
monetary policies in the 1970s, as well as the regime of fixed, but adjustable, 
exchange rates of the European Monetary System in the 1980s. In this context, 
policymakers perceived subsidized credit as an important compensating mechanism. 
                                                 
4 Jonathan Zeitlin, “Clusters and Industrial Districts,” 227-231 in Oxford Handbook of Business 
History, ed. Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford, 2008), 219-243.   
5 Michelangelo Vasta, “Italian Export Capacity in the Long-term Perspective (1861-2009): A Tortuous 
Path to Stay in Place,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 15, no. 1 (2010): 133-156. 
6 Bagnasco, Tre Italie, 153-162 and 168-184. 
7 For the institutional perspective see Linda Weiss, Creating Capitalism: The State and Small Business 
since 1945 (Oxford, 1988) and Giuseppe M. Longoni and Alberto Rinaldi, “Industrial Policy and 
Artisan Firms (1930s-1970s),” in Forms of Enterprise in 20th Century Italy. Boundaries, Structures and 
strategies, ed. Andrea Colli and Michelangelo Vasta (Cheltenham, 2010), 204-224. 
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These were also crucial decades in the regional program for southern Italy, which 
peaked in the mid-1970s, faced instability in the 1980s, and was finally abandoned in 
1993, after the funds allocated to regional policy dried up. Thus, the Census year 1991 
closes the research. 
This article is organized as follows: the next section provides an overview of 
the enduring nature of districts and contextualizes the research question. The article 
then moves on to introduce the plethora of financial schemes for small concerns 
introduced in Italy in the second half of the twentieth century. The penultimate section 
analyses the importance of those financial subsidies for the two district cases, and the 
final section draws the conclusions. 
 
Industrial Districts as Production Systems 
 
Alfred Marshall observed that late-Victorian British districts were 
characterized by a concentration of small firms which could offset their 
disadvantages, as compared to large firms, through external economies and economies 
of specialization.8 The concept of districts or clusters has evolved since its 
Marshallian formulation and has been discussed from a variety of perspectives.9 
Districts can be broadly defined as spatial concentrations of interconnected firms, 
mostly SMEs, specializing in the same industry or producing related goods. This 
                                                 
8 For Marshall's writings on economies arising from the concentration of small firms see his Principles 
of Economics (1890, Ninth Variorum ed. 1961), vol. 1, 266-271; and also The Early Writings of Alfred 
Marshall, 1967-1890, ed. J.K. Whitaker (1975), vol. 2, 196-198. 
9 The concepts of industrial districts and cluster have different emphases. For a discussion of these 
cognate concepts see Jonathan Zeitlin, “Industrial Districts’; John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp, 
“Districts, Networks and Clusters in England: An Introduction,” in Industrial Clusters and Regional 
Business Networks in England, 1750-1970, ed. John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp (Aldershot, 2003), 1-
18; Michael Porter and Christian Ketels, “Clusters and Industrial Districts: Common Roots, Different 
Perspectives,” in A Handbook of Industrial Districts, ed. Giacomo Becattini, Marco Bellandi and Lisa 
De Propris, (Cheltenham, 2009), 172-183. For a review of approaches see Valeria Giacomin, “A 
Historical Approach to Clustering in Emerging Economies,” 2017, Harvard Business School Working 
Paper 18-018.  
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system of production is typically embedded in the local socio-cultural context, 
creating a mutually reinforcing dynamic.10  
The district pattern of business organization, which Philip Scranton defined as 
“the other side of the Second Industrial Revolution,” waned with the emergence of 
mass production. For instance, networked textile producers in Philadelphia declined 
because they could not compete with large-scale distribution via department stores 
and chains. Such a “buyer market” led to a decline in products’ style and technical 
advantages, a separation of design from manufacturing, and relegated specialists to 
niches.11 In other instances, such as bicycle manufacturing in Birmingham, small 
independent workshops moved to mass production in search of new markets 
following the Great Depression. The blueprints for standardized goods were provided 
by the dominant firms, thus the metalworking workshops lost their ability to design 
and produce independently.12 
Other districts thrived, however. This was the case of Grand Rapids’ “styled 
furniture” and the machine-tool industry in Cincinnati. Both districts, albeit hit by the 
Great Depression, managed to prosper, developing innovative processes and 
products.13 Although experiencing economic downturns, the district of Oyonnax in 
France, a production center of boxwood combs in the early nineteenth century, thrived 
to become a center specialized in the production of plastic moulds, serving customers 
all over the world.14 The silk-weaving districts of Kiryu in Japan, where the 
                                                 
10Michael J. Enright, “Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated Industries,” in 
Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise, ed. Naomi 
R. Lamoreaux and Daniel M. G. Raff (Chicago, 1995), 103-142; Giacomo Becattini, “The Marshallian 
Industrial District as a Socio-Economic Notion,” in Industrial Districts and Inter-Firm Co-operation in 
Italy, Frank Pyke, Giacomo Becattini and Werner Sengenberger, (Geneva, 1990), 37-51. 
11 Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 
(Princeton, 1997), 349. 
12 Sabel and Zeitlin, “Historical Alternatives,” 160. 
13 Scranton, Endless Novelty, 349-350. 
14 Jean Saglio, “Local Industry and Actors’ Strategies: From Combs to Plastics in Oyonnaux,” in World 
of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization, ed. Charles F. Sabel and 
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manufacture of high-quality silk dates to the seventeenth century, overcame 
challenges through constant innovation of products and processes, and an effective 
governance structure.15   
Since the late nineteenth century, the “First Industrial Divide”, the two 
systems of flexible specialization and mass production have competed, monitored, 
and learned from one another, producing hybrid forms such as flexible mass-
production, and adapting innovations from large to small-scale production.16 
However, victories on either side proved only temporary. When districts declined, 
supporters of flexible specialization claim this was not due to the exhaustion of 
technological possibilities and lack of competitiveness, but rather to social, political, 
and economic forces supporting mass production.17 This interpretation is not 
uncontroversial, as critics claim that reducing production costs per unit is necessary in 
order to meet the limited purchasing power of the majority of consumers. 
Furthermore, economies of scale are fundamental in various heavy industries, which 
are major contributors to industrialization and growth.18 
A clear manifestation of forces favorable to mass production occurred in the 
post-World War II period, when national governments supported the introduction of 
mass production techniques and the paradigmatic American organization of 
production. These were considered essential for the international competitiveness of 
                                                                                                                                            
Jonathan Zeitlin (Cambridge, 1997), 419-460. 
15 Tomoko Hashino and Takafumi Kurosawa, “Beyond Marshallian Agglomeration Economies: The 
Roles of Trade Associations in Meiji Japan,” Business History Review 87 (Autumn 2013): 489-513; 
Hideki Yamawaki, “The Evolution and Structure of Industrial Clusters in Japan,” Small Business 
Economics 18 (February 2002): 121-140. 
16 Zeitlin, “ Historical Alternatives,” 124-125. 
17Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial Divide, 21 and 163-164; Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, 
“Stories, Strategies, Structures: Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production,” in World of 
Possibilities, ed. Sabel and Zeitlin, 1-33.  
18 Compare Zeitlin ‘Historical Alternatives’ and David S. Landes, “Small is Beautiful. Small is 
Beautiful?,” in Piccola e Grande Impresa: un Problema Storico, ed. Fondazione ASSI/Istituto per la 
Storia dell'Umbria Contemporanea (Milan, 1987), 15–28. 
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national economies.19 States used fiscal and monetary policies to stabilize demand to 
induce firms to expand and increase investment and output.20 Michael J. Piore and 
Charles F. Sabel attribute to national governments an important role in forging mass 
markets and favoring mass-producing firms, particularly in Japan, Germany, Italy, 
and France.21 However, mass production techniques were not the only possible path 
towards economic growth and international competitiveness. In the post-World War II 
decades, many firms and regions enjoyed economic success by basing their 
competitive strengths on economies of specialization, and strategies of flexible 
specialization by adjusting output and introducing new products (or versions of 
products) in response to changing demand and in an effort to create a varied demand 
through constant innovation.22  
The resilience of the district as a pattern of business organization and its 
economic importance became particularly noticeable in the unstable economic 
conditions of the 1970s and 1980s, when districts proved able to thrive in a market 
characterized by segmented and fluctuating demand.23 It was at this stage that districts 
in Italy, as well as in other European countries and in Japan, attracted the attention of 
sociologists, historians, and economists. Attention fell not only on established 
historical districts, but also later ones, contributing to outstanding economic growth of 
their regions, such as the Correggio plastic district near Reggio Emilia (Northeast 
region of Italy), medical instruments in Mannheim (Baden-Wuttemberg region in 
                                                 
19 Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial Divide, 163. 
20 Charles F. Sabel, “Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies,” 18 in 
Reversing Industrial Decline? Industrial Structure and Policy in Britain and Her Competitors, ed. Paul 
Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford, 1989), 17-70; Zeitlin, “Historical Alternatives,” 126. 
21 Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial Divide, 157; Bernard Ganne, “Industrial Development and Local 
Industrial Systems in Postwar France,” in: Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development, 
ed. Michael Storper and Allen J. Scott (London and New York, 1992), 216-252. 
22 Zeitlin, “Historical Alternatives”. 
23 Zeitlin, “Industrial Districts”; Sabel, “Flexible Specialisation”.     
 8 
Germany), and the furniture district in Salling (West Jutland in Denmark). 24 The 
growth of districts was also related to the restructuring of large corporations and their 
outsourcing to localized suppliers, following labor rigidities in the late 1960s in 
various countries, and the oil shocks of the 1970s.25  
 An under-investigated factor in this revival is that a number of countries 
introduced policy measures in favor of small businesses. In Japan specialized 
financing institutions began to operate after World War II when the government 
launched schemes providing financial assistance and training to SMEs in the 
automotive and machine-tools industries.26 West Germany’s government provided 
low interest loans for small enterprises under the European Recovery Program. These 
funds, which were repaid and re-lent, continued to be important for SMEs even in the 
1980s.27 Moreover, additional schemes were introduced in subsequent years, which 
were extended to the whole country after its reunification.28 Similarly, the French 
government encouraged the establishment of the Companies for Regional 
Development, which acquired minority interests in regional SMEs and provided long-
term loans. However, their operations developed slowly and, following the crises of 
                                                 
24 Pier Paolo Patruco, “The Emergence of Technology Systems: Knowledge Production and 
Distribution in the Case of the Emilian Plastics District,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 29, no.1 
(2005): 37-56; Bjørn Asheim and Lars Coenen, “Knowledge Bases And Regional Innovation Systems: 
Comparing Nordic Clusters,” Research Policy 34, no.8 (2005): 1173–1190; Thomas Brenner, 
“Identification of Local Industrial Clusters in Germany,” Regional Studies 40, no.6 (2006): 991–1004; 
Regional Cluster Atlas Baden-Wurttenberg, 2016, www.cluster-portal-bw.de (accessed on 21 August 
2018). 
25  Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean. The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of 
Flexibility (New York, 1994), 37-52 and 134-135; Gary Loveman and Werner Sengenberger “The Re-
emergence of Small-Scale Production: An International Comparison,” Small Business Economics 3, 
no.1 (1991): 1-37. 
26 Yuko Aoyama, “Policy Intervention for Industrial Network Formation: Contrasting Historical 
Underpinnings of the Small Business Policy in Japan and the United States,” Small Business 
Economics 12, no. 3 (1999): 217-231. 
27 Ulrich Wengenroth, “Small-scale Business in Germany,” 123-124 in Small Firms, Large Concerns. 
The Development of Small Business in Comparative Perspective, ed. Konosuke Odaka and Minoru 
Sawai (Oxford, 1999), 117-139.  
28 Stephanie Weimer, “Federal Republic of Germany,” 136 in The Re-emergence of Small Enterprises. 
Industrial Restructuring in Industrialised Countries, ed. Werner Sengenberger, Gary W. Loveman and 
Michael J. Piore (Geneva, 1990), 98-143; Dirk Czarnitski, “Research and Development in Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises: the Role of Financial Constraints and Public Funding,” Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy 53, no.3 (2006): 335-357. 
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the 1970s and a contraction of SMEs’ own capital, the government introduced direct 
financial subsidies, such as soft loans and tax breaks, in addition to supporting the 
development of SMEs’ technological capabilities.29  
The US government also introduced measures in favor of small businesses: the 
Small Business Administration (SBA) was established in 1953, resulting from the 
amalgamation of pre-existing federal agencies. Congress passed the Small Business 
Investment Act in 1958, which placed Small Business Investment Corporations 
(SBICs) under the SBA’s control.30 The purpose of SBICs was to ensure supply of 
long-term and equity capital to SMEs, being aware that the limited availability of 
capital hampered SMEs’ growth.31   
Policies for SMEs might have been overlooked because they were regarded as 
too generic in explaining districts’ emergence in specific locations.32 This is a valid 
view, considering the variety of contributory factors to the growth of districts. 
However, it does not seem a sufficient reason to dismiss a priori a possible 
contribution of the policies to the growth of district firms. 33 Industrial districts interact 
dynamically with the broader institutional and economic environment, and this 
interaction is deemed as requiring further investigation.34 Recent work has examined 
the role of institutions in shaping the governance and structure of clusters in 
developing countries, while a rich contemporary literature in economic geography, 
                                                 
29Michele Lescure, “SMEs in France, 1900-1975,” 160-162 in Small Firms, Large Concerns, ed. 
Odaka and Sawai (Oxford, 1999), 140-167. Rachel Parker, “From National Champions to Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises: Changing Policy Emphasis in France, Germany and Sweden”, Journal of 
Public Policy 19, no. 1 (1999): 63-89. 
30Bernard L. Boutin, “Small Business Loans from Government Sources,” in Financing of Small 
Business: A Current Assessment, ed. Irving Pfeffer (New York, 1967), 314-332; Mansel G. Blackford, 
A History of Small Business in America (Chapel Hill, 2003), 134-137. 
31 Boutin, “Small Business”; Blackford, A History, 135; Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, “Venture 
Capital in Silicon Valley: Fuelling New Firm Formation,” in Understanding Silicon Valley: The 
Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region, ed. Martin Kenney (Stanford, 2000), 98-123.  
32 Carlo Trigiglia, Sviluppo senza Autonomia; Effetti Perversi delle Politiche nel Mezzogiorno 
(Bologna, 1992). 
33 Weiss, Creating Capitalism; Anna Spadavecchia, “Financing Industrial Districts in Italy: A Private 
Venture?,” Business History 47, no. 4 (2005): 569-593. 
34 Zeitlin, “Industrial Districts,” 227-231. 
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policy and entrepreneurship analyses the impact of government policies on the 
development of clusters. 35  
Nevertheless, the historical role of national policies in the paradigmatic case of 
Italian districts has attracted little attention, as Jonathan Zeitlin points out. 
Researchers have stressed the importance of local banks, not only for the provision of 
capital, but also as coordinators of the local financial system, and of circuits of credit 
internal to the districts.36 However, criticisms have been leveled at other types of 
government policies, such as granting favorable legal conditions to small concerns, 
because these provided perverse incentives to firms to remain small, rather than 
pursuing growth opportunities, thus distorting the country’s industrial structure.37 This 
article focuses on a specific type of government intervention - financial subsidies in 
the form of soft loans and grants. These were major policy instruments aimed at 
stimulating recipient firms’ investment and growth, and therefore a form of 
government intervention which might have contributed directly to the growth of 
district firms.38 
 
Government Subsidies for Small Businesses 
 
                                                 
35 Valeria Giacomin, “Negotiating Cluster Boundaries: Governance Shifts in the Palm Oil and Rubber 
Cluster in Malay(si)a (1945-1970 ca.),” Management and Organizational History 12, no.1 (2017): 76-
98; See for instance articles in journals such as Journal of Economic Geography, Regional Studies; 
Research Policy and Small Business Economics. 
36Francesca Carnevali, Europe’s Advantage (Oxford, 2005); Giuseppe Conti and Giovanni Ferri, 
“Banche Locali e Sviluppo Economico Decentrato” in Storia del Capitalismo Italiano dal Dopoguerra 
a Oggi, ed. Fabrizio Barca (Rome, 1997), 429-465. Gabi Dei Ottati, “Trust, Interlinking Transactions 
and Credit in the Industrial District,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 18 (December 1994): 529-546. 
37 Paolo Di Martino and Michelangelo Vasta, “Reassessing the Italian ‘Economic Miracle’: Law, 
Firms’ Governance, and Management, 1950-1973,”Business History Review 92, (Summer, 2018): 281-
306. 
38Stimulating investment was by far the largest single area of policy intervention in favor of SMEs in 
the OECD countries. Other policy tools included: administrative and fiscal measures, such as reduced 
employment contributions and tax breaks, training and mentoring schemes, loan guarantees for start-
ups. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Small Businesses, Job 
Creation and Growth: Facts, Obstacles and Best Practices (Paris, 1997), 27. 
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Italy was no exception in relying on large corporations to assure the 
international competitiveness of the national economy in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, with state-owned large enterprises in mechanics, metalworking and chemicals 
playing an important role.39 However, policy makers were also aware of the weight of 
small businesses in the country’s industrial structure, although not every political 
party saw them as an asset. The ruling Christian Democratic Party (DC for its Italian 
acronym) supported SMEs for economic and socio-political motivations. It considered 
small concerns as a path to economic development, capable of adopting new 
technologies, and essential for a cohesive society, rather than one polarized between 
owners of means of production and unionized laborers.40 The Communist Party (PCI) 
regarded small firms as economically inefficient and as the initial stage of enterprises, 
which would either grow or eventually fold; nevertheless, their presence avoided 
economic stagnation. Moreover, supporting the middle class was instrumental in 
avoiding their being influenced by a rightist ideology.41 Furthermore, SMEs had 
produced intermediate institutions such as the “Italian Confederation of Small and 
Medium Firms” (CONFAPI) in 1947, which was effective in promoting the interests 
of their members and expressing their difficulties in accessing market finance.42 
The DC support and the skepticism of the PCI and the Socialist Party (PSI) 
informed parliamentary debate on the bill which established the Regional Medium-
term Credit Institutions (RMCIs) in 1950. These specialized in the provision of 
                                                 
39 Franco Amatori, Matteo Bugamelli and Andrea Colli (2013), “Technology, Firms Size, and 
Entrepreneurship,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy since Unification, ed. Gianni 
Toniolo, (Oxford, 2013), 455-484.  
40 Alberto Rinaldi and Anna Spadavecchia, “The Political Economy of Financing Italian Small 
Businesses, 1950-1990s,” in People, Places and Business Cultures: Essays in Honour of Francesca 
Carnevali, ed. Paolo Di Martino, Andrew Popp, and Peter Scott (Martlesham, 2017) 55-74, and 
bibliography therein.  Weiss, Creating Capitalism, 55-80, 104-126; Paolo Peluffo and Vladimiro 
Giacché, Storia del Mediocredito Centrale (Rome-Bari, 1997), 5-9.  
41 Rinaldi and Spadavecchia, “The Political Economy”and bibliography therein. 
42 CERPI, Il Finanziamento alle Piccole e Medie Imprese in Italia, (Milano, 1973), vii and 112.  
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medium-term credit, defined as longer than one year, to SMEs.43 DC representatives 
articulated the economic rationale of small industrial concerns and of a financial 
system geared towards them.44 The DC Minister of Industry, Togni, stressed the 
socio-economic purpose of credit and its importance for achieving “the common 
good.”45 In opposition, representatives of the PSI stressed that small businesses were 
not competitive and were destined to be absorbed into large concerns. The law very 
often mentions “small and medium-sized business,” but it does not specify their size. 
The scheme, aimed at directing credit to SMEs, established a ceiling of 15 million lire 
(US$ 311,000 in 2016 prices) for loans, which increased to 50 million lire in 1954 
($865,018/2016).46 The financial structure of the RMCIs reached completion two years 
later, with the establishment of their refinancing institution, the Mediocredito 
Centrale, supported especially by the DC government led by De Gasperi (1945-1953), 
the Association of Industrialists (Confindustria), and Menichella, the governor of the 
Bank of Italy (1946-1960).47  
 The DC Minister of Industry, Colombo, proposed a generous soft-loan 
scheme for SMEs in 1959. Various political parties, including the PCI and PSI, agreed 
on the aims of the bill, and debate focused on an effective implementation of the 
scheme, such as only targeting SMEs. Fixing a ceiling on the loans initially addressed 
this issue.48 Subsequent decrees specified the size limit of SMEs, defined as having 
                                                 
43 For the distinction between short-term credit (up to one year), and medium (above one year) see 
Giandomenico Piluso, “From the Universal Bank to the Universal Bank: A Reappraisal,” Journal of 
Modern Italian Studies 15, no.1 (2010): 84-103. 
44 Senato della Repubblica, IX Commissione Industria, Commercio Interno ed Estero, e Turismo, 
Riunione del 1 Giugno 1950. 
45 Peluffo and Giacché, Storia del Mediocredito, 6-18. 
46Associazione Bancaria Italiana (ABI), La Legislazione Italiana sul Credito Speciale all’Industria e al 
Commercio (Roma, 1963), 179-180. 
47 Peluffo and Giacché, Storia del Mediocredito,  31-36. 
48 Camera dei Deputati, Discussione del Disegno di Legge 1494, 23-24 Luglio 1959.  
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fewer than 500 workers and 3bn lira in fixed and circulating capital ($45.2 
million/2016), but with ad hoc criteria for the South.49  
 The disadvantages faced by small businesses in accessing market finance were 
even more pronounced in the south, since capital scarcity is a typical feature of 
underdevelopment. Subsidies to southern SMEs began in 1957 through the regional 
policy for southern Italy, managed by a dedicated institution: the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno (Cassa).  The post-World War II plan of promoting industrialization in 
southern regions had as its advocates both managers and economists at the state-
owned Institute for Industrial Reconstruction, and at the Bank of Italy, as well as the 
socialist Minister of Industry, Morandi.50 The program gained domestic and 
international support. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
actively participated in its design and implementation because it considered the 
development of southern Italy essential to the reconstruction and modernization of the 
country’s economy.51 
 Cassa’s subsidies, grants, and soft loans initially targeted SMEs, meeting 
defined size limits (fewer than 500 workers and fixed capital below 3bn lire, 
equivalent to $47.2 million/2016), but soon those limits disappeared, so that by 1959 
any firm could benefit from financial subsidies on the first 6bn lire ($90.4 
million/2016) of their investment. This change marked a diversion of the regional 
policy’s initial intention to develop an organic network of SMEs, because of the need 
to attract modern industries and large investment from the North. In addition to the 
major national programs, schemes addressing specific and sectoral problems appeared 
                                                 
49 CERPI, Il Finanziamento, 30. 
50 Amedeo Lepore, “Cassa per il Mezzogiorno e Politiche per lo Sviluppo,” in Istituzioni ed Economia, 
ed. Andrea Leonardi (Bari, 2011), 107-165. 
51 Leandra  D’Antone, “<<Straordinarietà>> e Stato Ordinario,” in Storia del Capitalismo Italiano, ed. 
Fabrizio Barca (Rome, 1997), 579-625; Michele Alacevich, “Postwar Development in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno: Analyses and Policies,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 18, no. 1 (2013): 90–112. 
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in subsequent years. The lack of a coherent industrial policy is one interpretation of 
the proliferation of subsidies, later called a “jungle of incentives,” by which the same 
firm could benefit from several schemes. 52   
The Central Bank also introduced measures to shelter small businesses from 
credit squeezes. This was the case in the 1970s when, due to high inflation and 
negative interest rates (1973-75), banks preferred lending at higher interest rates on 
the short-term market.53 To redirect money into the medium-term market the central 
bank introduced measures such as the “portfolio obligation” in 1973, and from 1973-
78, imposed ceilings on loans, except for those below 500 million lira 
($4.1million/2016), to ensure a flow of credit towards small firms.54  
Subsidized credit acquired greater importance as a corrective mechanism to 
facilitate firms’ access to credit in the deteriorating economic conditions following the 
first oil-shock.55 A simplification of the soft loan system followed the 1975 recession, 
when Italian GDP fell by 2.1 percent, the first fall since World War II.56 One single 
scheme (law 902/76) supplanted various earlier ones, and provided subsidized credit 
throughout the country on progressively preferential conditions for less developed 
regions. The DC government, led by the PM Andreotti, proposed the bill, gaining 
support from other political parties. MPs across the political spectrum raised issues 
concerning the administration of subsidies, such as delays in extending approved 
                                                 
52 Giovanni Federico and Renato Giannetti, “Italy: Stalling and Surpassing,” in European Industrial 
Policy: The Twentieth-Century Experience, ed. James Foreman-Peck and Giovanni Federico (Oxford, 
1999), 124-151. A body of research interprets the lack of a coherent industrial policy as a result of 
various governments’ inability to reform the state and its apparatus. See Di Martino and Vasta, 
“Reassessing the Italian ‘Economic Miracle,” and bibliography therein. 
53 Fratianni and Spinelli, A Monetary History, 228-233; Harold James, Europe Reborn: A History, 
1914-2000 (Harlow, 2003), 334-335. 
54 Davide Croff and Franco Passacantando, “Il controllo diretto del credito,” in La politica monetaria 
in Italia. Istituti e strumenti, ed. Franco Cotula and Pietro de’ Stefani (Bologna, 1979), 563-585. 
55 Francesco Vassalli and Giuliano Visentini, Legislazione Economica, Settembre 1976- Agosto 1977 
(Milan, 1978), 27-30. 
56 Alberto Baffigi, Stephen N. Broadberry, Claire Giordano and Francesco Zollino, “Data Appendix – 
Italy’s National Accounts (1861-2010),” in The Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy since 
Unification, ed. Gianni Toniolo (Oxford, 2013), 631-712.  
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loans and the lack of a clear definition of the size of beneficiary firms, to prevent 
larger concerns from accessing this scheme. Thus, the bill fixed the upper limit of 
eligible firms to 1.2bn lire in fixed assets ($6million/2016) and up to 300 employees.57 
 The 1980s saw an emphasis on measures promoting innovation, particularly 
with laws 46/1982 and 696/1983, which subsidized technological innovation within 
firms of any size and the adoption of high-tech equipment in SMEs, respectively. The 
SME scheme, proposed by various ministers of the coalition government led by the 
Socialist PM, Craxi, provided grants for the purchase and leasing of high-tech 
equipment. Parliamentary debate, which focused only on its management, displayed 
wide support for this scheme. Precise identification of the beneficiaries was one of the 
issues raised; the solution was the adoption of the SME definition specified in 
previous schemes.58  
The “Extraordinary Intervention for the South” underwent a period of 
instability between 1980 and 1986, when eleven ministerial decrees prolonged the 
program. Political parties agreed to maintain an additional flow of resources to the 
South, but there was disagreement concerning the institutional framework of these 
funds. In 1986 the regional program received further finance extending its life until 
1993, when domestic and external pressures halted the flow of funding. There was 
resentment in the North about the level of public expenditure in the South.  The policy 
appeared as a drain on the northern economy and in forty years it had achieved few 
tangible results. In addition, there was growing antipathy towards the role of the 
public administration in the Italian economy and the institutional structure operating 
the Mezzogiorno policy. The European Commission also influenced the course of 
                                                 
57 Camera dei Deputati, Commissione XII Industria, Artigianato e Commercio con l’Estero, 27 April 
1978. 
58In particular the definition specificied in law 675/1977. Camera dei Deputati, Seduta 3 Novembre 
1983; Law 19 Dicembre 1983, n. 696. 
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events by refusing to approve the 1992 bill to refinance the program. In December 
1992 the Italian Parliament decided to abolish the “Extraordinary Intervention” and its 
institutions, replacing the policy with a national program of assistance for depressed 
areas.59 
 
  The Importance of Subsidies for Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli 
 
A handicraft tradition in footwear emerged in the districts of Barletta, in 
Puglia and San Mauro, in Emilia Romagna (see Map 1), at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  
 
                                                 
59 Salvatore Cafiero, Storia dell’Intervento Straordinario nel Mezzogiorno (1950-1993) (Manduria-
Bari-Rome, 2000). 
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Map 1. Italian industrial districts, 2001.  (Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Distretti Industriali e 
Sistemi Locali del Lavoro 2001, Rome, 152.) 
 
Over time the two areas specialized in different segments of the industry: 
medium and high segments of leather footwear in San Mauro, and low and medium 
segments of leisure footwear in Barletta, where firms specialized in rubber-soled 
footwear mainly because of a scarcity in alternative raw materials, such as leather. 
This was the case in one of the currently largest firms (included in the sample), Cofra, 
Barletta  
San Mauro Pascoli  
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established in 1938 by Ruggiero Cortellino. Industrial production began in Barletta 
after World War II with Calzaturificio Giuseppe Damato Ltd, also in the sample. The 
success of the firm was evident in the district and had a demonstration effect. Barletta 
and surrounding municipalities developed additional specializations in clothing and 
textiles, which had started in the interwar period and benefited from military orders 
during World War II. The industry grew in the 1950s and 1960s and numerous 
spinoffs occurred, particularly in the fast-growth period of the 1970s and 1980s.  
Among these spinoffs were the firms Ripatex and Magia, both included in the data 
sample.60  
The 1970s and 1980s were Barletta’s “Golden Age” when new equipment and 
raw material were introduced which led to additional specializations in the medium-
low segment of sport and leisure footwear. Firms were able to purchase new 
equipment owing to suppliers’ favorable payment terms and subsidies extended in the 
context of the regional policy, which was crucial at a time of restrictive monetary 
policy of the late 1970s and the deterioration of the competitiveness of Italian exports 
in the 1980s, after Italy joined the European Monetary System. 61  
As with Barletta, shoemaking skills existed in San Mauro in the early 
twentieth century (drawing labour on account of military exemption for artisanal 
labour in the sector during World War I). In the interwar period local shoemakers 
established a cooperative under the patronage of the Fascist government, and 
Mussolini himself donated 88,000 lire ($84,650/2016) to promote mechanization of 
local production in 1939. Various families started their businesses after World War II 
and introduced industrial techniques in the second half of the 1950s. By the end of 
                                                 
60 Gianfranco Viesti, “L’Abbigliamento nella Puglia Centrale” in Mezzogiorno dei Distretti, ed. 
Gianfranco Viesti (Rome, 2000): 59-95. 
61Michele D’Ercole, “Il Distretto Barlettano della Calzatura,” in Mezzogiorno, ed. Viesti, 37-58;  
Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli, A Monetary History of Italy (Cambridge, 1997), 235-239. 
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that decade some of those firms that would later become industry leaders, such as 
Casadei, Pollini, and Sergio Rossi (all included in the sample analyzed in this article), 
had established their workshops or small factories.62 
The 1970s and 1980s were important decades also for San Mauro. Producers 
strengthened their positions in domestic and international markets, and abandoned the 
fierce competition in the medium-low segments to focus on medium-high and luxury 
products. Emphasis was placed on product innovation, high-quality raw materials, and 
partnerships with fashion designers, in addition to local labour skill upgrading by 
establishing a vocational training center “The International Footwear School and 
Research Centre” (Cercal), in 1984.63   
For a comparison of the two districts we can consider that, in 1971, in the 
sectors of specialization (footwear and leather goods, and clothing and textiles), 
Barletta had more than 4,286 employees, whereas San Mauro had 3,318. By 1981 the 
corresponding figures were 9,610 and 4,735 respectively, and, in 1991, 14,122 and 
4,804.64 The much lower employment growth in the northeastern district does not 
indicate stagnation. Barletta’s sectors of specialization included footwear and 
garments, whereas San Mauro remained footwear only. Moreover, the area and 
workforce of the Barletta district was greater than its northeastern counterpart. In spite 
of the difference in size, the value of the two districts’ exports is similar.65 This 
suggests that San Mauro’s production has a higher value added and a greater share 
serves foreign markets.  
                                                 
62 Roberto Garavini, Franco Calistri, and Ornella Cilona, La Quarta Italia (Rome, 1988), 240-242; 
http://www.distrettocalzaturesanmauropascoli.it/formazione.asp, accessed on 07/01/2017. 
63 Roberto Garavini, Franco Calistri and Ornella Cilona, La Quarta Italia (Rome, 1988), 240-242. 
64 Data source: Istat, I Censimenti delle Attività Produttive dal 1951 al 1991. Dati Comunali. CD-ROM 
(Rome, 1998). 
65 The latest available figures refer to 2014. San Mauro’s export amounted to €464 million and 
Barletta’s counterpart was €460 million. 
http://www.osservatoriodistretti.org/sites/default/files/rapporto-2015.pdf accessed on 10/01/2017 
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To assess the role of government financial subsidies in the critical decades of 
the 1970s and 1980s, the records of two samples of companies located in each district 
at the relevant Chambers of Commerce were collected (Bari for Barletta and Forlì for 
San Mauro).66 The two, relatively small samples of companies (fifty-three overall), 
consist of family-owned enterprises whose legal status is either limited liability or a 
public company, as these are the only ones legally obliged to disclose their records. 
The inclusion of those companies alone creates bias in the samples, as the smallest 
companies in the districts are unlikely to go public, and their records would therefore 
have not been available. The dataset also includes reports and balance sheets of 
companies in other manufacturing sectors comparable to those of specialization, so as 
to obtain samples of appropriate size (see the Appendix for details). 
The Barletta and San Mauro samples include thirty-two and twenty-one 
manufacturing companies respectively, active or public at various times over the two 
decades. These provide 681 observations (annual balance sheets): 460 for southern 
companies and 221 for the northeastern sample. The latter is smaller, as the district 
and the sectors of specialization are smaller than in Barletta. Moreover, companies in 
the northeastern sample did not have public status or were not trading during the 
1971-91 period; most incorporated as, or went, public in the 1980s. 
Table 1 below displays information about the size of sample firms. All fall 
within the definition of a SME applied in the 1970s (scheme 902/76), having fixed net 
assets below 1.2bn lire. Since 1.2bn lire in 1976 prices equals 2.3bn lire in 1980 
prices, even the largest companies in the samples, Cofra in Barletta with fixed assets 
of 1,849 million and Pollini in San Mauro with fixed assets of 1,646 million, are 
below the threshold. Moreover, sample firms fall into the European definition of 
                                                 
66 It would have been interesting to cover also the previous decades. However, company records were 
very limited for the 1950s and 1960s. 
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SMEs as small firms with fixed net assets and turnover below 10 million Euros, and 
medium-sized firms with fixed net assets of 10-43 million Euros and turnover of 10-
50 million Euros. Converting Table 1 into Euros, the fixed assets of the largest firms 
in both samples do not exceed 4.6 million Euros, and their turnover is below 33.4 
million Euros. The EU definition also considers the headcount: small firms employ 
fewer than 50 workers and medium-sized firms 50-250. However, a systematic 
comparison of sample firms in terms of employment is not feasible, as companies’ 
annual reports provide only intermittent workforce information.67 
The firms in the samples are owned by the founders or their descendants.  
Even public companies did not trade their shares on the stock exchange in the years 
under analysis, as shown in their balance sheets. This means that these firms comply 
with the EU’s “independence” criterion: no more than 25 percent of the SMEs’ capital 
should be controlled by partner enterprises or public bodies. 68 Moreover, firms in the 
samples are “family businesses” as the founders or their descendants are the sole 
equity-owners and are directly involved in their management.69  
                                                 
67 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on the implementation of Commission 
Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (Brussels, 2009). 
68 Ibid. 
69 For a definition of family business see Christina Lubinski, “Path Dependency and Governance in 
German Family Business,” Business History Review 85, no. 4 (2011): 699-724 and literature therein. 
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Table 1  
 Net capital stock and turnover of firms in the samples, 1971-91. 
 Net Capital Stock 
m 1980 lire 
Net Capital Stock 
000 2016 $ 
Turnover 
m 1980 lire 
Turnover 
000 2016 $ 
 Barletta San 
Mauro 
Barletta San 
Mauro 
Barletta San 
Mauro 
Barletta San  
Mauro 
Range 12-1,849 8-1,646 32-4,992 22-4,444 55-13,680 49-11,058 148-36,932 132-29,853 
Average 464 307 1,253 829 1,788 3,101 4,827 8,372 
Median 285 155 769 418 580 1,967 1,565 5,310 
Source: Chamber of Commerce in Bari (henceforth CCB) and Chamber of Commerce in Forlì 
(henceforth CCF) company records, for full archival reference see the Appendix. 
Note: Conversion rates from the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Coefficienti per tradurre valori 
monetari dei periodi sottoindicati in valori del 2016 (Rome, 2017). 
 
Companies in the Barletta sample are, on average, larger in terms of fixed net assets, 
but have a lower turnover which may reflect the different market segments in which 
the two districts specialize. The higher level of fixed assets is consistent with the 
findings of larger studies, which have interpreted this feature of southern SMEs as a 
distortion caused by the subsidies, as these lowered the cost of capital relative to 
labor.70  
Figure 1 below displays the capital structure of companies in the two samples.  
 
                                                 
70 Filippo Siracusano and Carlo Tresoldi, “Le Piccole Imprese Manifatturiere nel Mezzogiorno: 
Diseconomie Esterne, Incentivi, Equilibri Gestionali e Finanziari,” 112 in Il sistema finanziario nel  
Mezzogiorno, Numero Speciale dei Contributi all’Analisi Economica, ed. Banca d’Italia  (Rome, 
1990), 103-167. 
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Figure 1. Capital structure of the Barletta and San Mauro samples.  
Keys: Medium-term credit includes loans from financial institutions and bonds; internal funds include 
paid-up capital, contributions from directors and reserves; subsidies include subsidized loans and 
grants. (Source: CCB company balance sheets and CCF company balance sheets.) 
 
 
Market finance, either in the form of short- or medium-term credit, is an 
important component of the sample firms’ capital structure. This is consistent with 
previous studies showing that firms within industrial districts had greater access to 
market finance, in particular bank credit, as banks and firms are part of the same 
fabric which reduces information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, makes 
it easier for banks to assess borrowers’ risk, and prevents moral hazard.71 
                                                 
71Conti and Ferri, “Banche Locali,”; Paolo Finaldi Russo and Paola Rossi, “Credit Constraints in Italian 
Industrial Districts,” Applied Economics 33, no. 11 (2001): 1469-1477; Francesca Carnevali, “Between 
Markets and Networks: Regional Banks in Italy,” Business History 38, no. 3 (1996): 84-100; Joseph E. 
Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” American 
Economic Review 71, no. 3 (1981): 393-410.  
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Paid-up capital and reserves, included in internal funds, are greater for firms in 
the northeastern sample, particularly in the 1980s, indicating these firms are more 
profitable.72 Commercial debt is the single most important source of finance in both 
samples, reflecting the long repayment period of trade credit, on average ninety days. 
It is also an indicator of the importance of circuits of credit internal to districts.73 
Government subsidies, including grants and soft loans, are clearly more 
important for firms in the southern sample than for their northeastern counterpart. 
This situation reflects the more generous subsidies available in the South and the 
limited availability of market medium-term finance. The literature assessing the 
importance and impact of government subsidies is extensive, and certain studies have 
focused on SMEs.  A study by the Mediocredito, including a sample of 3,852 across 
all manufacturing sectors between 1989 and 1991, found that, overall, 53 percent of 
firms in the sample received subsidies, with the South being above the national 
average at 58.9 percent.74 Other researchers have examined additional impacts of 
financial subsidies on small businesses.75 However, none of these studies differentiate 
between SMEs located within districts and those elsewhere, nor do they clarify 
whether district firms have preferential access to subsidies. Moreover, no studies have 
yet provided an insight into the importance of subsidies for firms within districts, 
which is a gap this research aims to fill. 
                                                 
72For a more detailed discussion of the capital structure see Anna Spadavecchia, “Financing Industrial,” 
569-593. 
73 Dei Ottati, “Trust, Interlinking Transactions”. 
74 Michele Bagella, Gli Incentivi di Politica Industriale: Presupposti Teorici e Valutazioni Empiriche, 
Osservatorio sulle Piccole e Medie Imprese Quaderni di Politica Industriale n. 21 (Roma, 1998). 
75 Giovanni Trovato and Marco Alfò, “Credit Rationing and the Financial Structure of Italian Small 
and Medium Enterprises,” Journal of Applied Economics 9, no. 1 (2006): 167-184; Gianfranco E. 
Atzeni and Oliviero A. Carboni, “The Effects of Subsidies on Investment: An Empirical Evaluation on 
ICT in Italy,” Revue de l'OFCE 97 bis (2006): 279-302. 
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Bagella and Caggese argue that soft loans and grants can be considered 
effective if the profitability of recipient firms increases, not only while these receive 
the subsidies, but also subsequently, when they are no longer subsidized. Firms 
should move from position 1 in Figure 2 below, characterized by low and highly 
variable profit, to position 2, with higher and less variable profit, when receiving 
subsidies. This should happen because subsidies increase the recipient companies’ 
profits and reduce the variability of profits – an indicator of risk – by providing an 
additional, less variable, inflow of funds.76 Furthermore, firms are learning 
organizations, and recipient companies should learn how to conduct their business 
better while in the subsidized stage.77 This methodology has never been applied in full 
because of a want of longitudinal company records, something that this historical 
research provides. 
 
                                                 
76 Bagella and Caggese, “Struttura del Capitale.” 
77 This aspect is studied in work on learning by doing. See for instance Naomi R. Lamoureaux, Daniel 
M.G. Raff, and Peter Temin ed., Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries (Chicago, 1999). 
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Figure 2. Profitability and risk of subsidized and non-subsidized firms: the ideal scenario 
Keys: position (1) = low and highly variable profit; position (2) = higher and less variable profit; 
competitive firm = ideal position characterized by even higher and less variable profit. (Source: 
adapted from Bagella and Caggese, “Struttura del Capitale,” 836.) 
 
  
The companies’ performance in the post-subsidy stage is of critical importance. For 
them to return to position 1 would mean that their profitability could improve only by 
constant subsidies, entailing a permanent capture of government funds and, in 
extreme cases, the bailing out of troubled firms, which are unwanted policy outcomes. 
Moreover, if the company returned to position 1 it would be perceived by banks as a 
“bad company” and would be credit-rationed, whereas if it remained in position 2, or 
moved to the ideal position of “competitive firm,” it would not be credit-rationed 
again.  A caveat related to this methodology is that it does not account for factors 
other than subsidies in the performance of recipient firms, and does not aim to 
quantify a cause-effect relationship between subsidies and firms’ performance.  
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Table 2 looks at the profitability of firms in the two samples, using two 
measures: return on equity and rate of return. The variability of these financial ratios, 
indicated by the coefficients of variation in brackets, is a standard indicator of risk.78 
The division into stages of the companies’ life reduces the number of observations 
available for each sub-period used in Figure 1; therefore, it is appropriate to study the 
sample firms in the whole 1971-91 period.  
 
                                                 
78 Richard  A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (Boston, 2003), 187-
219. Table 2 displays coefficients of variation as these are more appropriate than standard deviations 
for comparing different samples.   
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Table 2 
Profitability, Barletta and San Mauro samples, 1971-91  
(weighted averages, coefficient of variation in brackets) 
 
 Firms a Firm age 
(average) 
Return on 
equitiesb 
Long term capital % 
fixed net  
assetsc 
Equity % fixed 
net assetsd 
Barletta 
 
     
Pre-subsidy 16 3.5 0.6  (3.35) 
 
74.4 
 
72.1 
Subsidized 26 (3) 12.1 5.1  (2.7) 
 
116.4 
 
92.2 
Post-subsidy 6 (2) 17.9 0.2  (1.02) 
 
100.7 
 
93.5 
Never 
subsidized e 
6 (4) 7.6 11.2  (7.7) 
 
126.7 
 
91.5 
San Mauro 
 
     
Pre-subsidy 4 9.0 4.3  (1.6) 
 
135.5 
 
130.3 
Subsidized 11 (2) 18.0 12.0  (1.2) 
 
222.0 
 
177.6 
Post-subsidy 4 19.7 15.3 (0.7) 
 
256.8 
 
220.5 
Never 
subsidized e 
9 (4) 7.9 12.8  (1.8) 
 
250.8 
 
166.5 
     
Gap between San Mauro and Barletta 
 
Pre-subsidy   3.7 61.1 58.2 
      
Subsidized   6.9 105.6 85.4 
      
Post-subsidy   15.1 156.1 127 
      
Never subsidized   1.6 124.1 75 
      
Source: CCB and CCF company balance sheets. 
Note: differences in means have been tested for significance: in the subsidized and post-subsidy groups 
the level of significance is either 1% or 5% depending on the specific ratio and percentage; in the pre-
subsidy and never-subsidized groups the levels of significance are either 5% or 10%. 
The gap between San Mauro and Barletta has been computed as the difference between the weighted 
averages of the two samples. 
Keys: 
a: number of companies in each group. Number of failed companies in each group in brackets; 
b: return on equities defined as profit (or losses) divided by equities (weighted average); 
c: long-term capital as a percentage of fixed net assets; 
d: equity as a percentage of fixed net assets; 
e: “never subsidized” companies (excluding bankrupt companies’ final year of activity). 
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Companies in the subsidized stage are older, indicating the difficulty of 
securing subsidies in the early stage of their activity. This is confirmed by previous 
studies and reflects the involvement of credit institutions in handling subsidies. These 
institutions are cautious in extending loans to new businesses, preferring companies 
with a proven track record.  
Overall, firms in the southern sample display lower and more variable profits, 
that is higher risk, than their northeastern counterparts, a result confirmed by studies 
based on larger samples.79 This is not surprising, considering that firms in the Barletta 
district trade in lower value-added products. The annual reports of the southern firms 
often mentioned low, if not declining, growth in local and national markets, which 
limited their ability to exploit economies of scale and, in turn, might have dictated a 
lower utilization of production capacity.80 Only the largest companies in the southern 
sample, such as Damato and Cofra, mentioned exporting to Britain, whereas the 
reports of northeastern firms such as Casadei, Rossi, and Pollini frequently mentioned 
exporting to Northern Europe, Japan, and the United States.81 The southern textile 
firms Tucci and Ripatex also mentioned owning obsolete equipment and having 
related expenses for repairs, as well as difficulties in procuring spare parts.82 Other 
studies have taken an “ecosystem” approach and pointed out the detrimental effects 
on the southern economy of macroeconomic and institutional factors, such as poorer 
infrastructure, inefficiency of the public administration and rigidities in the labor 
market, such as national wages.83 
                                                 
79 Siracusano and Tresoldi, “Le Piccole”; Bagella and Caggese, “Struttura del Capitale.” 
80 For example CCB company records Sbia, Sfi, Sga, Sto various years. 
81 CCB company records Scof, various years; CCF company records Nca, Nfr, Npn, Npo, Nrs, various 
years. 
82 CCB company records Stu and Sri, various years. 
83Riccardo Faini, Gianpaolo Galli and Curzio Giannini, “Finance and Development: The Case of 
Southern Italy,” in Finance and Development: Issues and Experience, ed. Alberto Giovannini 
(Cambridge, 1992), 158-214; Emanuele Felice, Perchè il Sud E’Rimasto Indietro (Bologna, 2015). 
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Southern sample companies shift from low profitability and high risk before 
subsidies, to higher profitability and lower risk when subsidized. In the post-subsidy 
stage they become much less profitable and less risky, displaying values below those 
of the pre-subsidy stage. Therefore, from position 2 in the Figure, they do not 
progress to the ideal position of the “competitive firm,” but retreat beyond the initial 
position 1 occupied in the pre-subsidy stage.  
Companies in the northeastern sample display the “ideal” behavior. They 
move from position 1 before subsidies to position 2 when subsidized, and in the post-
subsidy stage they move closer to the “competitive firm” position. Thus, the 
profitability gap between firms in the two samples not only increases when they 
receive subsidies, but increases even further in the post-subsidy period. The “never 
subsidized” groups display the smallest profitability gap, due to the high-profit and 
high-risk strategy of the southern sample. This clearly entails a higher probability of 
failure, as also indicated by the high number of failed companies (in brackets in the 
Firms column). Despite not relying on subsidies, these firms display high levels of 
long-term capital as a percentage of fixed net assets. Their main sources of long-term 
borrowed capital are the partners themselves.  
 The comparison in Table 2 casts doubt on the effectiveness of subsidies. 
Southern companies with access to subsidies seem to pursue a “survival” strategy, 
whereas unsubsidized ones pursue a “profit maximizing” strategy. It could be argued 
that southern entrepreneurs prefer to reap benefits from institutions and abandon the 
market rationale in a particularly difficult market due to competition from various 
fronts, including the black economy.84 However, this may not be necessarily the case, 
and the behavior of firms in the southern sample may be economically rational. The 
                                                                                                                                            
 
84 Trigiglia, Sviluppo, 93-94. 
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low capitalization of southern companies and particularly the scarcity of company-
owned capital (indicated by equity as a percentage of fixed net assets in Table 2), 
suggest that southern companies would have very little capital to cover possible losses 
from riskier, though more profitable, projects. Therefore, as long as they can increase 
their profits artificially through subsidies, undertaking low-profit  and low-risk 
projects can be the most economically rational choice, where the economic rationale 
is the survival of the firm. The propensity for a low-profit and low-risk strategy also 
aligns with various studies on developing economies. These have documented how 
the shortage of liquid assets, such as cash that can be drawn on in case of emergency, 
makes households in developing economies choose a low-risk and low-return crop. 
Moreover, firms faced with high, and to some extent uninsurable, risk, trade off lower 
for more stable profits.85  
The literature on family businesses sheds further light on the low-profit and 
low-risk strategy observed here.86 Family firms facing a high-risk ecosystem may 
prioritize survival over profit maximization, in order to ensure continuity of the 
family legacy for themselves and future generations. This leads to a long-term 
orientation in investment decisions, even though this in turn might result in lower 
short-term returns.87  
 
                                            CONCLUSION 
                                                 
85 See for instance Stefan Dercon, “Risk, Crop Choice, and Savings: Evidence from Tanzania,” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 3 (1996): 485-513; Arne Bigsten and Måns 
Söderbom, “What Have We learned from a Decade of Manufacturing Enterprise Survey in Africa?” 
The World Bank Research Observer 21 (Fall 2006): 241-265.  
86 Firms in the sample can be considered as family businesses as they are owned by the founder-
entrepreneurs or their descendants, and these are involved in the running of the business. 
87 Andrea Colli, “Risk, Uncertainty, and Family Ownership,” in The Endurance of Family Businesses: 
A Global Overview, ed. Paloma Fernandez Perez and Andrea Colli (Cambridge, 2013), 85-108; Mark 
Casson,  “The Economics of the Family Firm,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 47, no. 1 
(1999): 10-23; James J. Chrisman, Jess H. Chua, Allison W. Pearson and Tim Barnett, “Family 
Involvement, Family Influence, and Family-Centered Non-Economic Goals in Small Firms,” 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 36, no. 2 (2012): 267-293. 
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This article has challenged the thesis that national policies have had a negligible, if 
not detrimental, influence on the growth of districts in the second half of the twentieth 
century. Focusing on Italy, this research has explored the importance of financial 
subsidies for recipient firms within two districts in the 1970s and 1980s. Soft loans 
and grants represented a greater source of finance in the southern sample of Barletta 
than in the northeastern district of San Mauro. Considering that the second half of the 
1970s and the early 1980s were years of restructuring in both districts, it can be 
concluded that in the case of the northeastern district, government subsidies 
contributed to growth, but in the case of the southern district, these subsidies played a 
critical role in financing the restructuring which led to its growth. Nevertheless, 
government funds were more effective in San Mauro than in Barletta, in that the 
profitability of recipient firms increased there in the post-subsidy period, and not in 
Barletta. Small firms in the southern sampe became less risky and more profitable 
when subsidized, but reverted to lower profitability when they were no longer 
subsidized. An even more striking indication is displayed by the never subsidized 
group, which shows higher levels of both profitability and risk than the other southern 
groups, suggesting that firms, when subsidized, pursue a “survival” strategy which 
can be economically rational in the high-risk ecosystem they face.  
Two contrasting profiles of subsidised firms emerge from the analysis in this 
article: the subsidy-reliant, and the subsidy-strengthened, enterprise. The former 
profile is dominant in the Barletta sample and the latter in San Mauro. The figure 
below provides a snapshot of the firms’ profiles, and factors affecting the different 
impact of subsidies on the two samples, determining the profitability gap between 
them. The characteristics highlighted below are not exhaustive and refer only to those 
emerging from the analysis in this article. 
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Figure 3: Profiles of subsidised enterprises and the profitability gap. (Source: text) 
 
This research deepens our knowledge of the behavior of districts. Italian and 
international historiography has emphasized the important role of local institutions in 
the growth of districts. These were important in the resolution of disputes and market 
regulation, and in providing technical education and quality control.88 This research 
demonstrates that national institutions were also important, and sheds lights on a type 
of finance, i.e. soft loans and grants, largely overlooked in the literature on Italian 
districts.  
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The importance of investigating the impact of financial subsidies for SMEs on 
the growth of districts also stems from the wide diffusion of these policies. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, several countries launched such schemes in the post-
war era. Accounts of the development of the engineering district of Ota in Japan 
confirm their importance. The district emerged in the 1950s and grew rapidly, 
becoming an important manufacturer of auto parts. Government support enabled the 
upgrading of small businesses’ equipment and machinery in Ota as firms could secure 
subsidized long-term funds, which also crowded-in market credit.89 A further example 
is the high-tech cluster of Sakaki, where almost every firm employing fewer than 
twenty employees benefited from government support, and one third of all companies 
received government funds for the purchase of numerically controlled equipment.90 
The US government also took policy initiatives to help SMEs in the 1950s 
with the SBA and the Small Business Investment Corporations (SBICs) to ensure 
supply of long-term and equity capital to small businesses.91 Private investors, as well 
as institutions such as the Bank of America, established SBICs in Silicon Valley, and 
these grew rapidly from 1959 to 1968. However, the role of the SBICs as funders of 
high-tech firms was short-lived, as in the late 1960s venture capitalists opted for 
alternative forms of incorporation.92  
Research highlights a different type of federal policy as crucial for the 
development of this cluster, i.e. federal military spending and demand for electronics, 
space vehicles, communications technology, and computer programs.93 Thus, while 
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the American policy of financial support for SMEs was only of limited importance for 
Silicon Valley, a different facet of government policy was of paramount importance.  
This historical analysis of the contribution of financial subsidies to the 
development of districts and clusters addresses a gap lamented also in research 
dealing with contemporary clusters. Lehamann and Menter emphasize that “While the 
conditions for creating clusters and modalities of how clusters should be configured 
have been investigated intensively, evidence about the performance evaluation of 
public cluster policy is scarce.”94 Their research shows that financial support for 
clusters initiated by the German government in 2007 improved their productivity, but 
suggests that the policy was “picking winners,” i.e. highly competitive firms and 
clusters which did not need public resources.95 Conversely, studies on the impact of 
the French cluster policy, launched in 1998, found that financial incentives did not 
have a significant effect on firms’ productivity. Their analysis suggests that policy 
was captured by declining sectors and firms.96 Both types of drawbacks, i.e. “picking 
winners” and “bailing out” troubled firms can be observed particularly in the case of 
the southern district of Barletta, where both top performing firms and unprofitable 
businesses managed to capture government subsidies for long periods of time, which 
casts doubt on the management of such financial incentives.   
This research refines our understanding of the broader institutional context of 
the development of districts.  While it disputes that macroeconomic institutions have 
not favored the growth of districts, this article supports one of the fundamental tenets 
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of the “historical alternatives” approach, that the organization of production is shaped 
by politically defined economic and social interests. The Italian case, and other 
examples discussed in this article, clarify that national policies have contributed, to 
varying degrees, to the development of districts. Nevertheless, policies alone cannot 
guarantee the emergence of districts. They are an enabling factor, but the ecosystem 
in which districts are embedded provides impetus for learning and growth.  
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Appendix 
Records at the Chamber of Commerce in Bari 
Folder No Company Legal status Established Records available Product 
    From To  
826 San Pb/Ltd (1988) 1936 1951 1991 Food processing 
1,786 Sma Pb 1959 1959 1976 Clothing 
2,140 Svr Ltd 1967 1967 1991 Food processing 
2,191 Sin Ltd 1967 1968 1989 Food processing 
2,169 Ser Ltd 1/1967 1969 1985 Wood processing 
2,442 Sfi Ltd 1/1971 1971 1991 Textiles 
2,564 Sbc Ltd 1/1972 1972 1991 Textiles 
3,603 Stu Pv/Ltd 
(12/1977) 
3/1972 1978 1991 Wood processing 
2,635 Svc Ltd 11/ 1972 1973 1991 Food processing 
2,614 Sfs Ltd 11/1972 1973 1985 Textiles 
2,674 Sab Ltd /Pv (1986) 2/1973 1973 1986 Footwear 
2,690 San Ltd 3/1973 1973 1983 Clothing 
2,645 Sbia Pb 1973 1973 1991 Clothing 
2,632 Sal Ltd 1973 1973 1979 Clothing 
2,586 Sar Ltd 1973 1973 1988 Footwear 
2,749 Sri Pb 10/ 1973 1974 1991 Footwear 
2,769 Sst Pb 11/ 1973 1974 1990 Plastic 
2,788 Spl Pv/Ltd 
(4/1984) 
12/1973 1984 1991 Footwear 
2,840 Sca Ltd 3/1974 1974 1987 Footwear 
2,888 Sil Ltd 6/1974 1975 1989 Wood processing 
3,094 Smo Ltd 11/1975 1976 1981 Clothing 
3,400 Sga Ltd 3/1977 1979 1991 Footwear 
3,479 Sto Ltd 10/ 1977 1978 1991 Footwear 
3,546 Sbim Ltd 11/1977 1978 1991 Clothing 
3,593 Ste Ltd 12/1977 1978 1991 Footwear 
4,165 Sec Ltd 1/1980 1980 1991 Footwear 
4,427 Sja Ltd 9/1980 1980 1991 Clothing 
4,790 Sli Ltd 6/1981 1981 1991 Footwear 
4,110 Spo Pv/Ltd (1983) 1979 1983 1988 Footwear 
5,491 Sro Ltd 1983 1983 1991 Footwear 
5,475 Ssa Ltd 2/1983 1983 1991 Footwear 
4,600 Sco Pv/Ltd 
(6/1984) 
3/1981 1984 1991 Footwear 
Keys: Pv= Private partnership; Ltd = Limited liabilities; Pb= Public share. 
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Records at the Chamber of Commerce in Forlì 
 
Folder n. Company Legal status Established Records available Product 
    from to  
2,996 Nla  Ltd/Pv (1966-71) 1955 1956 1991* Footwear 
3,751 Nde Pb 1962 1963 1967 Fotwear 
4,442 Nci Pv/Ltd  (10/1974) 7/1968 1974 1991 Metal chairs 
5,676 Neu Ltd 3/1974 1974 1991 Footwear 
equipment 
5,212 Nrs Pv/Pb (12/1975) 4/1967 1976 1991 Footwear 
5,581 Nwi Ltd 12/1973 1974 1979 Footwear 
7,280 Nma Ltd 2/1978 1978 1987 Footwear 
8,146 Nal Pb 9/1979 1979 1991 Clothing 
8,367 Nca Pv/Pb (2/ 1980) 9/1966 1981 1991 Footwear 
4,935 Npo Pv/Pb (12/1980) 2/1972 1981 1991 Footwear 
3,484 Nfa Pv/Pb (4/ 1981) 1/1961 1981 1991 Footwear 
4,662 Nfr Pv/Pb (6/ 1982) 2/1970 1982 1991 Clothing 
10,471 Nri Ltd 6/1982 1982 1991 Footwear 
10,417 Nrf Ltd 5/1982 1982 1991 Leather items 
4,351 Nvi Pv/Ltd (11/1982) 8/1967 1983 1985 Footwear 
6,934 Nrm Pv/Ltd (2/1983) 6/1969 1983 1987 Clothing 
11,850 Npn Ltd 4/1984 1984 1991 Footwear 
5,325 Nrt Pv/Ltd (9/1985) 4/1973 1985 1991 Paper/card 
boxes 
12,904 Nti Ltd 4/1985 1985 1991 Footwear 
11,263 Nip Pv/Ltd (5/1989) 9/1983 1989 1991 Packaging 
13,580 Npl Pv/Ltd (7/1989) 12/1985 1989 1991 Leather items 
Keys as above; * excluding 1966-71 and 1973. 
 
 
 
